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влиял недавний финансовый кризис, последствия которого до сих пор переживает Япония. Вос-
пользовавшись этим, экономика Китая сегодня занимает почетное второе место в мире. Такой 
прорыв стал возможным благодаря стабильному росту сталелитейной и автомобильной отраслей, 
которые работают в основном на экспорт. Также, на рост экономики Китая сильно повлияло то, 
что страна является большим потребителем железной руды и нефти. Но основной проблемой эко-
номики Китая, на которую влияют уровень и качество жизни народа, является бедность - 40 млн. 
человек страны живет за гранью бедности, на что указывает объем ВВП при перерасчете на душу 
населения.  
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College of Europe Efficiency Claims 
 
Mergers may contribute to the realization of economies of scale and scope, thus allowing greater 
productive efficiency. At the same time, their behaviour can be in conflict with allocative efficiency. We 
are going to use the Williamsonian merger analysis (Williamson, 1968) as the analytical basis of the 
efficiency argument.  
Commission‘s activities on forcing the firms to give access to ―essential facilities‖ usually implying 
intellectual property rights objects may affect the incentives to invest in R&D [3, p. 316]. It would not 
correspond to the smart growth priority set by the EU 2020 strategy – ―developing an economy based on 
knowledge and innovation‖ [2, p.3]. Enforcement authorities should avoid focusing on short-term 
consumer welfare; this approach can discourage firms from competing dynamically and consequently 
delay the production of the improved products and services for the benefit of the consumers in future [3, 
p. 317]. 
Merger Regulation 139/2004 and Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers acknowledge the 
importance of taking efficiencies into account but only if they are substantial, merger specific, verifiable 
and quantifiable. The burden of proof is on the participating parties and is difficult to discharge before the 
directors take charge of the target company. Moreover, the requirement of the efficiency being merger 
specific is vague as the more important dynamic efficiencies may occur to management while organising 
the assets of the merging firms [5, p.352].  
Classical welfare economic analysis says that the creation of a monopoly can have a positive impact 
on total welfare and even consumer surplus. In case of a natural monopoly a single firm can supply a 
good/service to an entire market at the smaller cost than could two or more firms [6, p.290]. Monopolies 
are welcome in certain areas such as the development of operating systems, since this sphere requires 
uniformity of the products which correspond to the universal standard and are charged the single price all 
over the world. The Commission‘s competition policy has a more sceptical approach on this matter [8, p. 
330]. ―It is highly unlikely that a merger leading to a market position approaching that of a monopoly, or 
leading to a similar level of a market power can be declared compatible with the common market‖ [8, p. 
335].  
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Efficiencies should be taken into consideration in the case of creation of a dominance situation. 
―Economists have shown that, in certain circumstances, conduct such as price discrimination can have 
pro-competitive effect. The rigidity of the Commission test is at odds with economic theory, according to 
which it is not the nature of the conduct but the effects on the competitive structure that should be 
determinative‖ [3, p. 355].  
Industrial Policy Considerations 
―A sound competition policy is not in contrast with a sound industrial policy [7]‖. The Commission 
decisions in the sphere of merger control should be influenced by industrial policy considerations. The 
EU industrial policy is highly determined by productivity and employment. The Commission claims that 
the weakness in Europe‘s labour productivity is mainly due to the slowdown of Total Factor Productivity 
which increases as a result of the more efficient use of capital and labour in the economy and is dependent 
on industrial policy and structural reforms [1, pp.2-3]. One of the three Europe 2020 mutually reinforcing 
priorities is inclusive growth – ―fostering a high-employment economy delivering social and territorial 
cohesion‖ [2, p.3]. This objective can be realised with the help of large enterprises which can be created 
as the result of mergers. The impact of large enterprises on labour productivity can be shown in the 
relevant statistics. Large enterprises usually contribute a higher share of sectoral value added than 
employment, while the opposite is true for microenterprises. This shows a relatively high apparent labour 
productivity (value added per person employed) for large enterprises and a low level for microenterprises 
[4]. 
National vs EU regulation 
Europe needs European champions rather than national ones. The National Competition Authorities 
(NCAs) should apply substantive EU merger control rules where a merger has cross border effects, and 
improve cooperation among them. The revision of the mergers regulation's mechanisms for case 
allocation and re-allocation is important. This would mean abolishing the ―two-thirds rule‖, which forsees 
that mergers in principle forbidden under the EU merger regulation are nevertheless left to NCAs when 
more than two thirds of the parties turn-over is realised in one and the same Member States. The 
advantage would be a more consistent merger control in key areas of the EU economy [7, p. 86-87]. 
International trade 
Sustainable growth priority of the EU 2020 strategy as ―promoting a more resource efficient, greener 
and more competitive economy‖ [2, p.3] is not at odds with the creation of the merged companies. The 
European Parliament expressed its belief that ―… merger regulation must now be interpreted in the 
context of international competitiveness within increasingly globalized markets‖. Monopolies do not 
produce global welfare losses and it benefits the host state by creating a producer surplus. ―While some 
consumers in the host state might suffer, most of the lost consumer surplus will be externalized to the 
outsiders. Strategic trade theory, as developed by Krugman and others in the late 1970s, addresses these 
features of international trade. It maintains that increasing returns to scale characterize production in 
many sectors and that monopoly industrial organization thus constitutes the norm rather than a deviation 
for large portions of the most developed economies.‖ 
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